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The blurb on the dust jacket of
Tom Regan's The Case for Animal
Rights claims that the book "is des
tined to become a 'modern classic' in
the field of ethics, alongside Rawl's A
Theory of Justice and Nozick's Anar
chy, State and Utopia."
I took this
with a large grain of salt, but I lost
my scepticism as I read the book and
realized that Regan was offeri ng a
remarkable,
full-blown
theory
of
rights, covering humans and animals.
I won't be so bold as to predict that
it wi II have the impact of A Theory of

Justice, but it would certainly be a
pity if it were read only by those
interested in animal rights. The Case
for Animal Rights is a major contribu

tion to moral philosophy generally and
to the animal rights movement in par
ticular, the latter because it is by far
the most ambitious work in the field
and because philosophers who read it
will no longer be able to ignore animal
rights, as Rawls did in A Theory of
Justice.

Regan's

theory of

rights

is

not
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simple, although it is expressed in
eminently precise and lucid language.
It makes the case for animal rights
without appeal to emotion, and does
not discuss specific injustices to ani
mals until the final chapter, after the
theory has been delineated.
Because
of its complexity and strict adherence
to reasoned argument, it will not
replace Peter Singer's Animal Libera
tion as the best book for introducing
non-philosophers to the cause of ani
mal rights (notwithstanding Regan's
devastati ng critiq ue of Singer's uti Iit
arian philosophy).
Here are the bare bones of Regan's
case for
animal
rights.
(Regan
argues for each step in detail, with
counterarguments
presented
and
refuted; what follows are only his
major conclusions.)
Animals
at
least normal mammals aged one yea r or
more
are conscious and exh ibit
perception, memory, desires, beliefs,
self-con sciou s ness, intention s, a nd a
sense of the future.
Possession of
these attributes makes an animal the
subject-of-a-life, and Regan postulates
that every subject-of-a-life has inher
ent value. This means that it has a
val ue that is independent of its uti Iity
to anyone else and of the quality of
its experiences.
Although the inher
ent value of subjects-of-a-life is a
postu late, Regan does not adopt it
a rbitrari Iy; rather, he defends it on
the g rou nd that without it, we cou Id
not account for our intuitive beliefs
about when it is wrong to harm indi
viduals.
Regan, furthermore, argues that
all subjects-of-a-life have equal inher
ent value.
This does not mean, as
one might suppose, that, if faced with
the choice of savi ng a drown i ng
human or a drowning dog, one should
flip a coin.
As will be discussed
below,
Regan thin ks that in most
cases we should choose the human.
Rather, to have equal inherent value
means
every
individual's
inherent

E&A VII

value must be respected by all moral
agents
rega rdless
of
the
conse
quences.
This, of course, is con
trary to the utilitarian view, which
would permit individual interests to be
overridden in the interests of the
overall good.
The principle that moral agents
must respect every individual's inher
ent value regardless of the conse
quences is Regan's "respect principle"
-- his sole categorical priciple. This
principle implies that individuals with
in herent val ue have a valid claim, and
hence a right, to respectful treatment
-- a right that is independent of an
individual's voluntary acts and of his
position
within
any
institutional
arrangement.
From the respect principle Regan
derives fou r other principles:
the
harm principle, which is the prima
facie direct duty not to harm anyone
with inherent value; the minimize
overriding
(" miniride")
principle,
which is that,. special considerations
aside, when we must choose between
overriding the rights of the innocent
many or the innocent few, and each
affected individual will be affected in
a comparable way, then we should
override the rights of the few; the
worse-off principle, which is that,
special considerations aside, when we
must choose between overriding the
rights of the innocent many or the
innocent few, and the harm faced by
the few wou Id ma ke them worse-off
than any of the many would be if any
other option were chosen, we shou Id
override the rights of the many; and
the liberty principle, which is that,
provided all those involved are treated
with respect, and assuming that no
special
considerations obtain,
any
innocent individual has the right to
act to avoid bei ng made worse-off
even if doing so harms other inno
cents.
As an example of the application of
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the miniride principle, Regan argues
that, if faced with a choice of savi ng
fifty trapped miners or one trapped
miner, we have an obligation to save
the fifty because the death of all
would be a comparable harm, and the
miniride principle requires that in
such ci rcumstances we save the many.
As an example of the application of
the worse-off principle, Regan argues
that (here I am changing the hypo
thetical slightly), if faced with a
choice of saving the lives of one nor
mal adult human or any number of
animals, we should save the human on
the ground that a human's death
would be an incomparably greater
harm to him than the death of anyone
of the animals would be to it.
The
reason the human's death would be a
greater harm is that "the magnitude of
the harm that death is, is a function
of the number and variety of opportu
nities for satisfaction it forecloses"
(p. 314).
This point raises several
questions that Regan does not ade
quately add ress.
First, how do we compa re the
opportu n ities for flyi ng u nder one's
own power or living underwater with
experiences that normal humans have?
As Thomas Nagel asked in a famous
ph i losophy a rticle, "What is it like to
be a bat?"
It sounds as if Regan
believes
that all
subjects-of-a-life
have equal inherent value, but some
are more equal than others.
Admit
tedly, it isi ntu itive to conclude that
the life of a human is worth more than
that of an animal, but to whom is it
intuitive? To humans, of course.
Second, who is not a normal human
being? Presumably Regan has in mind
the severely retarded or senile, but
what about a quadriplegic but mentally
normal human: should he be saved
rather than any number of animals?
His variety of opportunities for satis
faction is surely diminished, but how
does one
weigh
the
satisfactions
foreclosed
by a human's
physical
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handicap against those foreclosed by
an animal's natural mental limitations?
Third, doesn't computing potential
satisfactions to determine rights smack
of utilitarianism, even if aggregating
is
not
permitted?
Perhaps
what
should be computed is the potential
life expectancy of each individual, or,
to avoid favoring humans and tor
toises, the percentage of an individu
al's life that remains to be lived.
Fou rth, even if we compa re poten
satisfactions that would be forec
losed, are these not in part a function
of age?
Regan briefly acknowledges
that age is significant (p. 303), but
provides no guidance for consid,ering
it. What if the human is ninety (but
not senile) and each animal is young
and
healthy?
This question
also
a ri ses when the choice is to save one
human or fifty humans.
Under the
miniride principle, assuming compara
ble harms, the fifty should be saved.
But are the harms comparable if each
of the fifty has a life expectancy of
six years and the one has a life
expectancy of sixty years?

tia

There is one other conclusion that
Regan defends too cu rsori Iy; it is that
the respect principle imposes on all
moral agents "the prima facie duty to
assist those who a re the victims of
injustice at the hands of others" (p.
249) .
The existence of this duty
leads Regan to contend that merely to
become a vegetarian but not to work
to change the opinion of others "is to
become part of the problem rather
than part of the solution" (p. 353).
This is counterintuitive, at least to
this reviewer, and might be taken as
rhetorical except that The Case for
Animal Rights contains no other sem
blance of rhetoric.
How much of
one's life must be devoted to fighting
against injustices committed by others?
Utilitarians,
of course,
face this
problem too.
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I hope that the questions I have
invi
raised will be understood as an invitation to Regan and others to clarify
the case for animal rights, and not as
questioning the value of Regan's book
or even, necessarily, the validity of

The
expounds.
is beyond·
question the most important philosophphilosoph
ical contribution to animal rights and
is a major work in moral philosophy.
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